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Abstract
CAPTCHAs/HIPs are security mechanisms that try to prevent automatic abuse
of services. They are susceptible to learning attacks in which attackers can use
them as oracles. Kwon and Cha presented recently a novel algorithm that intends
to avoid such learning attacks and “detect all bots” [6]. They add uncertainties to
the grading of challenges, and also use trap images designed to detect bots. The au-
thors suggest that a major IT corporation is studying their proposal for mainstream
implementation. We present here two fundamental design flaws regarding their
trap images and uncertainty grading. These leak information regarding the correct
grading of images. Exploiting them, an attacker can use an UTS-CAPTCHA as an
oracle, and perform a learning attack. Our testing has shown that we can increase
any reasonable initial success rate up to 100%.
1 Introduction
Free on-line services have become prevalent since the broad deployment of the Internet
in the late 90’s. The abuse of such services, using automated methods, can be the first
step towards more sophisticated attacks that can result in significant revenue for the
attackers. Naor [7] was the first to propose a theoretical security framework based on
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the idea of discerning humans from bots using problems that could be solved easily by
humans but were thought to be hard for computers.
Many CAPTCHAs, including the currentlymost used one, are based on image clas-
sification. They require the user to tell which images from a set pertain to a particular
category ([11]). Many of these proposals have been analyzed and broken ([2, 4, 13]).
Most types of the CAPTCHAs based on classification, including image classifica-
tion CAPTCHAs, are susceptible to a learning attack. To perform one, all we need is
a bot based on a random or a very weak classifier that can successfully pass just a few
challenges, even if mostly by chance. Once a challenge is successfully solved, the bot
can learn the correct classification of the images in that challenge. Thus, the bot can
use the CAPTCHA as an oracle and dramatically increase its success rate.
In [6], Kwon and Cha proposed a way to prevent bots from learning new examples
using the CAPTCHA service as an oracle. To do so, they employ two mechanisms.
First, they add uncertainty to a grading function: when they grade an answer to a chal-
lenge, they do not take all images in the challenge into consideration. Second, they use
what they call “trap images” to detect “all bots”. Using these two mechanisms, they
propose to strengthen any image-based CAPTCHA into what we will call an Uncer-
tainty & Trap Strengthened-CAPTCHA (UTS-CAPTCHA).
These protectionmechanisms can play a fundamental role in enabling image CAPTCHAs
to be secure. This additional protection is of particular relevance because many Deep
Learning architectures, like DCNNs, are getting extremely successful at classifying
images [5, 1, 3, 15, 14, 12].
DL approaches have some limitations [8, 10, 9], but as of now, DL classifiers re-
main a serious threat to image classification CAPTCHAs.
In this article, we present an attack against the scheme introduced by Kwon and
Cha [6].
2 UTS-CAPTCHA
Kwon and Cha [6] propose a method to build a UTS-CAPTCHA from a typical im-
age classification CAPTCHA. In their example, they start from a one-class image
classification-based CAPTCHA. This CAPTCHA presents 22 images per challenge,
containing faces of people. Some of them are pictures of a popular person (Bill Gates,
co-founder of Microsoft Corp.). They divide their face images into two groups: M for
those depicting Bill Gates (M for “M”ust be picked) and NM for those depicting other
people (MN for “M”ust “N”ot be picked).
Then they strengthen it using two mechanisms:
• For each challenge, they select a random number of images between 0 and 8
that are not going to be graded (NE). The challenge can be passed if the user
answers correctly to the other images (inC−NE). Thus the users’ classification
of images in NE will be irrelevant towards marking the challenge as passed or
not.
• If a user u passes a challenge answering incorrectly to some images, these are
included in a set T Iu of trap images for that user. Following challenges will
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include 1 or 2 of these trap images in T Iu, and they will always be used for
grading.
In general, we can model a typical image classification-based CAPTCHA that uses
only one class as iCAPTCHA= (M,MN, |C|), where M is the set of images that pertain
to the class, MN are other images that are not from the class, and |C| is the number of
images used per challengeC.
This is a simplified model, as a general image-based CAPTCHA can be multi-class,
|C| does not need to be fixed, etc. This limitations do not affect the method proposed to
turn an image-based CAPTCHA into an UTS-CAPTCHA, nor they affect our proposed
attack.
The idea behind their proposal is that once a bot is miss-classifies an image in NE ,
and it is included in T I, the bot will continue to miss-classify it consistently.
Kwon and Cha add an image xi to the trap images set TI only when the challenge
C is correctly graded, but the image xi is incorrectly classified. This is possible as the
user will still pass the challenge, if that image is among the randomly selected ones
that will be irrelevant towards marking the challenge (xi ∈ NEC). As long as T I 6= /0,
Kwon and Cha always use the images in it. In each challenge there is one or two trap
images. If present, trap images always count towards marking the challenge as passed
or not.
3 Learning from trap images
It seems obvious that in Kwon and Cha’s scheme, and as long as the intended purpose
of detecting bots works, the size of TI will be much smaller than the size of the rest of
images on the database |M∪MN|. This is so because ideally, following [6], TI will be
filled once and only once per each bot.
Note that this scenario presents a problem. For each challenge C, less images are
taken from T I (1 to 2) than from M∪MN (22). Still, the size ratios of these two sets
are much more different in both cases. That is: 1,5|T I| 6=
|C|
|M∪MN| . This ratio difference
implies that for the challenges following the creation of TI, the images from T I will
repeat significantly more than the rest of images that appear in any challenge.
We can add a simple heuristic to a bot so it can detect trap images. It can be as
easy as counting the appearances of images since their last apparition in a challenge
that was passed. Then:
• if an image x keeps appearing much more than expected if it was from M∪MN
(|C|/(|M|+ |MN|)), and
• it has appeared in a challenge that was successfully solved, and
• in every challenge it has appeared since the above occasion, the challenge was
not passed
Then this image is probably a trap image, x ∈ T I. Great news, as once we learn
that an image is in T I, we know without a doubt the correct classification for it: the
opposite to what we have been answering to it so far.
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More precisely, we can run a Pearson’s χ2 test with 1 degree of freedom where the
target distribution is a Binomial in which the chances of xi appearing in a challenge are
are
|C|
(|M|+|MN|) . When the p− value of the test drops below a threshold (i.e. 0.05) we
can label an image as a trap image.
We can estimate the probability of Pr(x∈T I) based on its frequency of appearances
using Bayes’ theorem (Equation 1).
Pr(x1 ∈ T I|X = a(x1,h1,h)) =
Pr(X = a(x1,h1,h)|x1 ∈ T I)∗Pr(x1 ∈ TI)
Pr(X = a(x1,h1,h)|x1 ∈ TI)∗Pr(x1 ∈ T I)+Pr(X = a(x1,h1,h)|x1 6∈ T I)∗Pr(x1 6∈ T I)
(1)
Where:
• h1 : as we index challenges from 1 onwards as they appear, h1 is the highest
challenge number at which we saw the image x1, and that was passed by the bot.
Since them, the bot has not passed any challenge that included x1 on it (else, x1
would not be in T I).
• h : total number of challenges until this moment.
• a(x1,h1,h) : number of appearances of x1 in the challenges from h1 to h (h1 not
counting).
Let’s first solve each part of Equation 1. Pr(X = a(x1,h1,h)|x1 ∈ TI) can be written
as Pr(x1 has appeared a(x1,h1,h) times in h− h1 challenges, given that x1 ∈ T I). For
one challenge, the chances of x1 appearing (vs. not appearing) in the challenge, if
x1 ∈ TI, are:
Prx1T I =
Pr(x1 in a challenge |x1 ∈ TI) =
1−
(
T Is−1
eT Ipc
)
(
T Is
eT Ipc
) =
eTIpc
T Is
≈
E(eT Ipc)
eTIs
(2)
As long as 0<= E(eT Ipc)<= eT Is− 1, if not, Prx1T I = 1.
Where:
• eT Ipc : elements from T I presented per challenge. E(eT Ipc) is the expected
value, if eT Ipc is variable. In [6], they define eTIpcmin = 1 and eTIpcmax = 2,
and randomly choose eT Ipc from that interval as long as the size of TI allows
for it.
• T Is : size of TI.
• eT Is : (attackers’) estimation of the size of T I.
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There are several approximations to eT Is, the estimated size of T I. We can limit it
by considering the number of correctly solved challenges and the value of α . Yet there
are better approximations to it, some of which we are testing now.
We can similarly calculate Pr(X = a(x1,h1,h)|x1 ∈ T I) using the Binomial distri-
bution, Pr(x1 ∈ T I) , Pr(X = a(x1,h1,h)|x1 6∈ TI), Pr(X = a(x1,h1,h)|x1 6∈ T I) also
using the Binomial distribution and Pr(x1 /∈ T I).
Kwon and Cha also propose that if an image from T I is solved correctly (for a non-
specified cause), it should be removed from T I, as it no longer serves to differentiate
this bot. This removal mechanism further limits |T I|, thus increasing the repetitions of
appearances of images from T I. Our attack benefits from this.
Given any bot b that successfully solves the CAPTCHA with a particular rate β ,
Kwon and Cha comment that the upgraded version of the CAPTCHA, that we will call
UTS-CAPTCHA will lower down the success rate of b to 0 once they start to present b
with trap images.
We propose now an attack that can be based on any bot b able to solve an image
CAPTCHA with a minimal success rate (≥ 1%). Our attack significantly improves b
success rate with the strengthened version UTS-CAPTCHA by not just avoiding trap
images but in fact learning from then.
4 Attack design
Our attack leverages any given bot b that successfully solves the original image CAPTCHA
with a minimum success rate. Let β be its particular success rate 1. We will modify b,
allowing it solve the uncertainty & trap-augmented version of the original image-based
CAPTCHA (UTS-CAPTCHA for short). We do so by creating lb, an improved learn-
ing bot based on b. lb can identify and learn from the trap images of UTS-CAPTCHA.
To do so, for each image xi that appears in a challenge chi = x1, ...x|C| we calculate
the probability that prT I(xi) = Pr(xi ∈ T I).
To calculate it, we have to keep track of some values for each image xi: the number
of the last challenge that contained xi and that was correctly solved (h(xi,1)), the classi-
fication we gave for xi in h(xi,1) (ansh1(x1)) and the number of appearances of xi since
challenge h(xi,1) (a(xi,h(xi,1),h)). We also have to register the number of the current
challenge (h) and have an estimation of the size of T I at challenge number h (eT Ish).
This estimation can be done in several ways, for example using |(xi|prT I(xi)≥ T hTI)|.
With every new challenge chi = xi1 , ...xi|C| received, we have to consider the incre-
ment in the number of times an image xi has appeared, for those images xi ∈ chi . We
have to recompute prT I(xi) for every image in chi . But as prT I(xi) only increases for
the images xi ∈ chi , we might be able to restrict the updated computation to this set of
images in chi , unless we are using the whole set of prT I(xi) for something else, like
estimating |T I|.
We set a knowledge-threshold KT hTI , above which we will consider that we have
detected a new trap image 2. Whenever prT I(xi)≥KT hTI , we introduce this correction
1This means that b has an accuracy, as a classifier, of β
1
|C| .
2Note that there are more precise alternatives, as running a Pearson’s χ2 test with 1 degree of freedom
5
into our knowledge-base: lc(xi) = 1−ansh1(x1), where lc is the “learned classification”
. KT hTI is our “knowledge-threshold” with a sensible value, like 0.9.
Now we create a bot lb that classifies images xi as b does when xi 6∈ lc, but uses the
knowledge gained to avoid trap images. To do so, our bot classifies as per Equation 3.
lb(xi) = if xi ∈ lc then lc(xi) else b(xi) (3)
Note that xi will remain in TI until a challenge that includes xi is correctly solved
by lb. That will happen, as once we figure out that xi ∈ T I, we start classifying xi as
1− b(xi) and wait for it to appear into a challenge that is successfully solved by lb.
Only then we assume that xi /∈ TI.
5 Attack results
Kwon and Cha have implemented their UTS-CAPTCHA on-line. For each challenge,
downloading of the images takes over a few seconds, so a learning test involving thou-
sands of trials would take too much time to complete. We decided to perform all the
testing on our simulation of their UTS-CAPTCHA.
Figure 1: Attack success rate per successive series of 5000 experiments when mr = 5.
We are currently testing our attack with very promising results. Among our pro-
visional results, Figure 1 shows how the accuracy increases per each series of 5000
experiments as we keep learning more trap images. As can be seen, leveraging a bot
b with a minimal success ratio β = 1.4%, we are able to achieve a success rate of
lb = 100% with only 70K challenges.
6 Learning with uncertainty
Kwon and Cha [6] propose to add uncertainty to the evaluation of the challenges. In
their design, this measure has two potential benefits: prevent bots from learning the
where the target distribution is a Binomial in which the chances of xi appearing in a challenge are are
|C|
(|M|+|MN|)
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correct classifications, even when a challenge has been passed, and allow for the in-
troduction of trap images. This measure also has one important effect: it reduces the
strength of the CAPTCHA, as not all challenge sub-answers are graded.
This measure does not prevent a bot from successfully performing a learning at-
tack, as the chances of passing a challenge are still correlated with the correct image
classification. Full details of a similar attack can be built through the analysis of the
correlations of image classifications and challenges solved.
7 Conclusion
Kwon and Cha [6] present a way to increase the robustness of an image classifi-
cation CAPTCHA, creating a Uncertainty & Trap-Strengthened-CAPTCHA (UTS-
CAPTCHA). They propose to do so by preventing learning attacks and detecting bots.
This is of particular relevance given the recent achievements in ML ([5, 1, 3, 15, 14,
12]).
We show here that their design is flawed, as it still allows to perform a learning
attack. We are currently testing our attack with very promising results, leveraging a bot
with a minimal success ratio of 1.4% up to 100%.
We are currently analyzing whether there are protections for UTS-CATPCHAs
from our attack or similar attacks, as well as additional attacks to UTS-CAPTCHAs.
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